Heidegger e verdade : do juízo à relação desveladora com a existência

Abstract

The present work focused on selected texts from the initial phase of the philosopher Martin Heidegger that support the path of an ontology for the concept of truth, which the philosopher intended to gather a dense set of criticisms of the so-called traditional concept of truth, which has prevailed in Philosophy since the medieval period without what he indicates as an analytical due. Through the phenomenological method, and having as a backdrop the replacement of the problem of Being for fundamental ontology, an excerpt of his texts from the First Seminars of Freiburg to his work Being and Time is carried out in chapters I and II, and aspects general points that show the need to change the way of thinking about the truth and what is its foundation. Then, in Chapter III and in the Conclusion, under the reading of the transitional text “On the Essence of Truth” (1931), we try to point out the development of truth as unveiling at both levels of analytics: in terms of statements and in terms of human history, existence. The objective is divided into: showing how Heidegger's pretensions were not to offer a different or better concept of truth, which would rival the existing ones; he also tried to reposition the traditional logical-semantic concept to a secondary level in the face of a way of thinking that establishes a foundation, never presented before. To this end, Heidegger seeks to carry out a return to the reading of ancient Greek philosophers, and in them he brings to light the original sense of truth as aletheia, which means “to remove something from concealment”, “discovery”. In an existential analysis, it then shows how aletheia constitutes the aspect of the opening of Being-othere, and how this opening is the element that links all knowledge to the dynamicity of existence itself, and how this panorama justifies the impossibility of absolute truths.